Nebraska Law Review
Volume 47 | Issue 1

Article 13

1968

Case Digests

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
Recommended Citation
, Case Digests, 47 Neb. L. Rev. 162 (1968)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol47/iss1/13

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

162 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 47, NO. 1 (1968)
CASE DIGESTS
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS: Liability for Unsuccessful Sterilization
Operation.
Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. 1967).
Plaintiffs, husband and wife, brought suit to recover damages
resulting from the wife becoming pregnant after defendants had
performed an operation which was to render her sterile. At the
time plaintiffs engaged defendants to perform the operation, they
were the parents of nine children and the wife had an existing
bladder and kidney condition which would be aggravated by an
additional pregnancy. Defendants performed the operation and
about one year later the wife discovered she was pregnant. At the
hearing on appeal it was reported that both the mother and the
child survived the delivery.
Plaintiffs presented a number of theories in their petition.
Included were allegations of negligence, misrepresentation, and
contract. The lower court entered a judgment of dismissal after
sustaining without leave to amend defendant's demurer to the
complaint.
On appeal, the main issues were whether there was any basis
on which defendants could be held liable and whether the damages
alleged were legally cognizable injuries. The court held that the
lower court abused its discretion by sustaining defendant's demurrer
without leave to amend and remanded the case for disposition in
accordance with the opinion.
The court made no substantial deviations from the general
rules of law in the area of recovery against physicians based on
negligence, misrepresentation, and contract by their directions to
the lower court. See, Annot., 27 A.L.R. 1250 (1923). However, even
though the court cautioned that the determination of principles of
public policy must await proof of damages in the case, the court's
gratuitous statements on the issue of damages present some ideas
which are of interest for future cases.
The court disposed of two unsuccessful vasectomy cases Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934), and Shaheen
v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957), by saying that the former,
which refused to allow any recovery for expenses of birth, and
the latter, which refused to allow recovery for subsequent expenses
of rearing and educating the child, were poorly reasoned. They
said in reference to Christensen that it was a non sequitur to say
that the expenses of birth are too remote to the sterilization and in
reference to Shaheen that it begs the question to assume that the
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compensation sought was the normal expense of the birth of a
normal child. The court goes on to say that the preferable reasoning is that the members of the family have a "just share" in the
family income that the court must somehow protect. This is to be
handled by supplying the unwanted child with his own means of
support as he joins the family and thus prevent emotional disruption
of the previous family unit.
Since courts have been talking in terms of lack of proof of
damages when asked for recovery based on the ordinary expense
of rearing and educating a child, this decision presents a significant
breakthrough in the law. Increased social concern with the size
and financial position of the family could cause this position to
gain support. When considered in light of the expanding field of
products liability, this decision could hold substantial significance
for the manufacturers of birth control pills.
FEDERAL ESTATE TAxEs:

Retained Interest under Section 2036

Estate of Binkley v. United States, 358 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1966).
Union Planters National Bank v. United States, 361 F.2d 662 (6th
Cir. 1966).
Estate of Gutchess v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 554 (1966).
These three cases all involve virtually the same problem: the
estate tax treatment of an inter vivos transfer by a husband of the
family home to his wife, the husband continuing to live in the
house until his death. In all three cases the Commissioner has
sought to place the value of the home in the husband's estate, contending that, by virtue of the husband's continued occupancy, it is
a transfer with a retained life estate falling under INT. REV. CODE
1954, § 2036.
These cases are not the first in which the Commissioner has
attempted to secure this tax result. He had earlier made attempts
to place such property in a decedent's estate relying, as he has
recently, on Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949).
However, his prior efforts apparently met with little success and
in 1952, he acquiesced in Estate of Wier v. Commissioner, 17 T.C.
409 (1951), acquiesced in, 1952-1 Cum. BuLL. 4, wherein the court
held inter alia that a family home so transfered could not be
included in the husband's estate.
While the courts continued to rule that, absent a specific agreement for the husband's post transfer occupancy of the house, an
inter vivos transfer to his wife effectively removed it from his estate,
see, e.g. Stephenson v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. Va.
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1965). The Commissioner in 1966 apparently began a new concentrated attack on these transfers. He changed his acquiesence in
Wier to non-acquiescence, 1966-1 Cum. BULL. 4, and renewed his
attempts to include houses transfered to wives in the estates of
husbands who continued to occupy them. The three instant cases,
Binkley, Union Planter's National Bank and Gutchess followed in
rapid succession. The courts refusing to deviate from their former
position uniformly ruled that a husband transfering the family
house to his wife has no right to remain there and that in the
absence of an express agreement that he should continue to live
there, no implied agreement to that effect will be found. The transfer thus construed is not within the terms of section 2036.
While the courts' rulings might not be the same if the transfer
is between family members other than husband and wife, see Peck
v. United States, 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 97,145 (D. Ga. 1965), the Commissioner seems to have retreated from his attack on transfers of
the family home between spouses for he has acquiesced in Gutchess,
1967 INT REv. BULL. No. 6, at 6. While the Commissioner probably
will not at this time attempt to include homes transfered with the
transferor continuing his residence in the transferor's estate, it
should not be supposed that he has completely abandoned his attack
on all transfers in this area since it does not appear that he has
withdrawn his non-acquiescence in Wier.
TORTS:

Assumption of Risk

Makovicka v. Lukes, 182 Neb. 168, 153 N.W.2d 733 (1967).
Plaintiff Makovicka sought to recover damages from the defendant for personal injuries alleged to have resulted, in October of
1964, from what plaintiff terms as "a practical joke" and from
what defendant classifys as "horseplay." When the injuries took
place the defendant and his family were visiting at the farm of the
plaintiff and her husband. The defendant is a nephew of plaintiff's
husband and this was apparently one of many evenings that the
families spent together. On this particular evening, prior to the
incident which is alleged to have caused the injuries, the parties
were in the house joking, laughing and visiting. At approximately
eight p.m., about an hour after the defendant and his family arrived
at the farm, the defendant suddenly picked up the plaintiff in his
arms, carried her through the living room, over the porch and on
to the concrete covered banister which was about three feet above
the level of the sidewalk. With the plaintiff still in his arms, the
defendant lost his balance and jumped to the sidewalk below.
Plaintiff testified that at the time of this jolt, she felt an "odd or
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snapping sensation in her neck, but no pain." The defendant had
not dropped plaintiff neither had he fallen nor had either of them
been struck by any object. He then carried her back into the house.
The next evening, plaintiff went to the hospital with a swollen neck
which was later diagnosed as a branchial cleft cyst. The branchial
cleft was congenital; such a condition and its activation into a cyst
are unusual. The cyst was removed on December 12, 1964.
The evidence further shows that defendant had picked plaintiff
up on several occasions but on the night in question, even by
defendant's own testimony, plaintiff was "taken by surprise" and
protested such behavior although the defendant insists that the
protests were made in a playful manner.
After overruling the defendant's motion for a directed verdict,
the lower court submitted the case to a jury which found for the
defendant. The plaintiff assigned as error an instruction to the jury
on the issue of assumption of risk and the defendant contended
that his motion for a directed verdict should have been granted.
Reversed and remanded. Held: The defendant's motion for directed
verdict was properly overruled and under the circumstances it was
improper to submit the issue of assumption of risk to the jury.
The court is here apparently attempting to limit the doctrine
of assumption of risk as it disregards the attempts of the defendant
to show that the injury allegedly resulted from only one of many
similar incidents to which the plaintiff had not really or at least
strenuously and effectively objected. But rather the court took the
strict position that unless the plaintiff, subjectively, knew, understood and appreciated the risks of the particular conduct, she could
not be said to have assumed the risk and that even though the plaintiff may not have protested the course of conduct, the court would
not from this assume "an implied consent to be treated negligently."
The court in applying its "subjective standard" refused to be
influenced by the past conduct of the parties. "We cannot accept the
implication that the passive object of prior practical jokes or horseplay, who did not complain on previous occasions, should be treated
as assuming the risk of subsequent practical jokes or horseplay, of
which she has no knowledge, simply because she was again the
object. Neither can we understand how the plaintiff, having no
knowledge of intended horseplay, much less its scope or extent,
can be considered an active, voluntary participant who assumes
the risk." Malcovicka v. Lukes, 182 Neb. 168, 171, 153 N.W.2d 733,
735 (1967).
Even though this particular case may have little impact on
the widely predicted demise of the defense of assumDtion of risk,
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it is indicative of the gradual erosion which may in time, for all
practical purposes, render assumption of risk useless as a defense
to negligence actions.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:

Hospitals are now selling blood.

Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital, 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879
(1967).
Plaintiff brought suit against the hospital, C, a commercial blood
bank, and E blood bank, a voluntary, non-profit organization, for
injuries resulting from homologous serum hepatitis. The infection
was assumed by the court to be the result of "bad blood" furnished
by the blood banks to the hospital and then to the plaintiff by
transfusion. Plaintiff alleged negligence on the part of all the
defendants and also based her claim on implied warranty of fitness
for the use intended, or strict liability for furnishing dangerously
defective goods. In addition thereto, an issue concerning the possibility of recovery on the theory of express warranty arose in the
case.
Two factors in the case were undisputed: (1) at the time blood
was furnished by the blood bank to the hospital, and at the time
of the decision, no known test for determining whether human
blood contains the virus of homologous serum hepatitis existed;
(2) every bottle of blood furnished the hospital by the blood bank
bore in two places (and in two sizes) a disclaimer to the effect that
despite the highest care in the selection of the donors, human blood
may still contain the virus of homologous serum hepatitis and consequently the blood bank did not warrant against its presence in
the blood.
The first consideration of the court was whether the transfer
of blood by a blood bank to the hospital and by the hospital to the
plaintiff constituted a sale. The defendants relied on Perlmutter v.
Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954) which denied recovery, though leaving open the question of recovery on the
basis of negligence, on the same set of facts. The court in Perlmutter
struggled mightily with the issue of whether the transfer amounted
to a sale or was only part of the service performed by the hospital
and thus free from any attempted recovery on the basis of implied
warranty. The Perlmutter court, prefacing its rationale and holding by stating that while at times a determination as to whether
the "essence" of a contract was one of services or sale, it had "no
doubt" that a service was involved because the supplying of blood
by a hospital was,".., entirely subordinate to its paramount func-
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tion of furnishing trained personnel and specialized facilities in an
endeavor to restore ... health." 308 N.Y. 100, 106.
The court in Jackson had no doubt either-that such a transfer,
for consideration, is a sale-stating that it was unthinkable to hold
otherwise. The court cites the definition contained in the Uniform
Commercial Code (Neb. Rev. Stat. 2-106 (1), Uniform Commercial
Code, 1964) which provides: "A 'sale' consists in the passing of title
from the seller to the buyer for a price...." Thus, with a selfassurance equal to the Perlmutter court, the court in Jackson categorized the transfer as a sale.
This holding, however, is only the beginning of the ultimate
determination of the case, for the court goes on to state, and wisely
so, that a classification of a transfer is not determinative of the
defendants' liability.
The court states that strict liability in tort for harm caused
by defective merchandise sold is the same cause of action as that
asserted under warranty; the two are merely different labels for
the same legal right and remedy. The basic policy consideration
which lead to strict liability must be met before it will be imposed.
In the case of blood for transfusion which contains hepatitis the
court holds that the blood is neither defective nor unreasonably
dangerous to the user. The Restatement of Torts 2d, § 402 (A), comment (k), pp. 353-4 is used to support this position. The weighing
to be done in order to determine if strict liability is to be imposed
involves the means available for avoiding the risk of harm and the
extent of the risk balanced against the utility of the product. No
means of detecting the homologous serum hepatitis exists, the
extent of the risk is small, citing Fisherv. Welmington General Hospital, 1 Storey 554, 149 A.2d 749 (Del. Super. Ct. 1959) and the usefulness of blood is common knowledge. In addition, the court states
that where the harmful agent may be present without any error
or oversight on the part of the producer, the conclusive presumption of fault is inapplicable. The producer cannot know of its
presence and therefore cannot control the condition of the blood.
Thus, the court disposed of the plaintiff's argument for strict
liability.
In regard to the plaintiff's theory of implied warranty, the court
was satisfied to rely on the disclaimer of warranty contained on
the bottle. Under the Uniform Commercial Code (Neb. Rev. Stat.,
2-316, Uniform Commercial Code, 1964) such a disclaimer is valid if
reasonable, and since the virus cannot be detected the disclaimer is
reasonable.
The disclaimer, the court said, was also an express warranty
that the blood bank had used "'the utmost care in the selection of
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donors,'" again citing the Uniform Commercial Code (Neb. Rev.
Stat. 2-313 (1) (a) and (2) Uniform Commercial Code, 1964). The
court stated that despite the fact that the plaintiff had probably
never seen the label on the container she was still entitled to the
benefit of the express warranty. In addition to the possibility of
recovery on a theory of express warranty, the court also concluded,
after discussing the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and "common
knowledge", that the case had to go to trial on the issue of
negligence.
Although Jackson reaches almost the same result as Perlmutter,
it does present a more candid approach to the problem of infected
blood used in a transfusion. It holds that the transfer of blood is
a sale within the Uniform Commercial Code, which would seem
correct, but also holds that the hospital or blood bank or both may
escape liability through implied warranty of fitness by the use of a
disclaimer, which the court holds to be reasonable because of the
lack of any method for discovering homologous serum hepatitis in
blood. It refuses to invoke strict liability because the policy for
holding a party strictly liable is not met, and again the court places
a good deal of emphasis on the lack of an adequate discovery
technique. This rationale is almost identical to the secondary considerations given to support the result reached in Perlmutter, 308
N.Y. 100, 106. The question of negligence is apparently unchanged
from Perlmutter, and the court in Jackson adds the possibility of
recovery on a theory of express warranty as provided by the Uniform Commercial Code.
Thus, for all of the court's willingness in Jackson v. Muhlenberg
Hospital to hold the transfer a sale within the Uniform Commercial
Code, it can be but of little consolation for a hospital patient to
know that when he obtains blood through a transfusion he has been
a party to a sale rather than the recipient of a service and yet be
unable to recover damages if he is infected with homologous serum
hepatitis.
For all practical purposes, in the absence of negligence, a
vendor of blood cannot be held liable for the damages caused by
homologous serum hepatitis, which is exactly what Perlmutter v.
Beth David Hospital decided in 1954.

